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MILLER v. PERRY: FURTHER COMPLICATIONS IN
DETERMINING DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
In a small number of jurisdictions, statutes provide that only a resi-
dent administrator may bring a wrongful death action on behalf of his
decedent.' Such statutes prevent an out-of-state administrator from
bringing a wrongful death action in the state courts without the benefit
of a resident ancillary administrator. Since an ancillary administrator
would be necessary to sue resident defendants in state courts, federal
diversity jurisdiction would be seemingly impossible to obtain. 2 With the
exception of statutory interpleader cases,3 the rule of "complete diver-
sity" has been followed by federal courts since it was first laid down by
Chief Justice Marshall in Strawbridge v. Curtiss.4 After citing to the
jurisdictional statute,5 Marshall explained: ". . . where the interest is
joint, each of the persons concerned in that interest must be competent
to sue, or liable to be sued in those courts."' If complete diversity is to
'E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1203 (1959), § 105-1309 (1968), which in certain circum-
stances may operate to exclude foreign administrators from pursuing wrongful death actions
in courts sitting in Georgia; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-8(2), 28-173 (Repl. vol. 1966); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 26-59, 8-634 (Repl. vol. 1969), construed in Holt v. Middlebrook, 214 F.2d
187 (4th Cir. 1954); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-5-3, 55-7-6 (1966), construed in Rybolt v.
Jarrett, 112 F.2d 642 (4th Cir. 1940).
Kentucky law formerly provided that a foreign representative could not maintain a
wrongful death action in Kentucky courts without securing the appointment of an ancillary
administrator. Vassill's Adm'r v. Scarsella, 292 Ky. 153, 166 S.W.2d 64 (1942); see Sey-
mour v. Johnson, 235 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1956). However, a Kentucky statute now allows a
nonresident administrator to quality in the state under most circumstances. KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 395.005 (1972). As a consequence, a wrongful death action may now be maintained
in a Kentucky court by a nonresident administrator who has qualified in Kentucky or in a
federal district court in Kentucky, with diversity of citizenship as the jurisdictional basis.
Nonresident administrators who have also qualified in the state of defendant's residence are
not deemed to be a resident of that state for diversity purposes. See Mason v. Helms, 97
F. Supp. 312 (E.D.S.C. 1951) (applying a similar South Carolina Statute).
Statutes in Idaho and Oregon formerly excluded nonresident administrators from
bringing wrongful death actions without securing ancillary administrators. Cf. Elliott v.
Day, 218 F. Supp. 90, 93 (D. Ore. 1962).
'Since this action is based upon diversity of citizenship, a federal court, in dealing with
a right of recovery created by a state, will follow the state law. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99, 108-109 (1945), Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970), the statutory interpleader section, requires "two or more
adverse claimants of diverse citizenship." This provision has been interpreted as demanding
only minimal, as opposed to complete, diversity. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire,
386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967).
'7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
'Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78. This was the precursor of the modern
diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
17 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267.
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obtain, the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332,1 requires that no defendant be of
the same citizenship as any of the plaintiffs. However, in Miller v. Perry,'
the Fourth Circuit held that diversity was present in a case involving
North Carolina statutes which appeared to be destructive of diversity
jurisdiction. The Miller court said that the citizenship of an ancillary
administrator is of no consequence in the determination of diversity; it
held that the beneficiaries should be looked to in making such a determi-
nation
Miller v. Perry originated with the death, in a North Carolina auto-
mobile accident, of a minor Florida citizen, allegedly through the fault
of the Perrys, residents of North Carolina. The decedent's father, after
qualifying as his administrator in Florida, instituted an action against the
Perrys under the North Carolina wrongful death statute"0 in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. This
action was dismissed by the district court on its own motion, the court
noting that the father was not qualified to bring the action since he was
not a North Carolina citizen, as required by a statute which allows only
a North Carolinian to qualify as an administrator of an intestate's es-
tate."1
128 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interests and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects
thereof; and
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens
or subjects thereof are additional parties.
1456 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1972).
Vd. at 67.
"°N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (Repl. vol. 1966). This section requires the wrongful death
action to be brought by the administrator or executor of the decedent's estate.
21456 F.2d at 64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-8 (Repl. vol. 1966) provides in part:
The clerk shall not issue letters of administration or letters testamen-
tary to any person who, at the time of appearing to qualify-
(2) Is a non-resident of this state; but a non-resident may qualify
as executor.
The residency requirement of § 28-8 extends to plaintiff administrators in wrongful death
suits. See Monfils v. Hazlewood, 218 N.C. 215, 10 S.E.2d 673 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S.
684 (1941). It has been held that a local administrator is needed only when suit is filed in a
court sitting in North Carolina. General Steel Tank Co. v. Conner, 387 F.2d 372 (5th Cir.
1967). In Conner, the Fifth Circuit held that the North Carolina law had no extra-territorial
effect; therefore, when a district court in Georgia, following Georgia's conflict rule applied
North Carolina's wrongful death statute, the resident administrator requirement [of § 28-
8(2)] had no effect. Id. at 373.
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Still within the statutory period, the decedent's grandfather, a resident
of North Carolina, was qualified as ancillary administrator by a North
Carolina court. A second action was brought, in the name of the grand-
father, in which the father joined. This action was also dismissed for lack
of complete diversity between the parties. 2 Since the ancillary adminis-
trator, as the only party vested with the statutory right to sue,' 3 was the
real party in interest, the district court held that diversity did not exist. 4
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that for diversity pur-
poses the beneficiaries' 5 were the real parties in interest in cases where a
particular state law required the appointment of an ancillary administra-
tor.'"
The facts of Miller presented the Fourth Circuit with two obvious
alternatives. It could have granted diversity jurisdiction by striking down
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-8(2) as unconstitutional on the ground that a state
statute exercising dominion over federal jurisdiction violates the Suprem-
acy Clause. 7 To have chosen this avenue of approach would have re-
quired an extension of prior Supreme Court decisions 8 and would also
have put the Fourth Circuit in conflict with another circuit; however,
only a limited number of jurisdictions would be affected by such a prece-
12Miller v. Perry, 307 F. Supp. 633 (E.D.N.C. 1969).
"3The right to sue for wrongful death is purely a creature of statute; the right did not
exist at common law. See Horney v. Meredith Swimming Pool Co., 267 N.C. 521, 148
S.E.2d 554 (1966).
11307 F. Supp. at 637.
"5In this factual configuration, the decedent's father was at once the Florida principal
administrator and the beneficiary of the estate. Under either Florida or North Carolina law,
the parents would share equally, or the surviving parent would take the estate completely,
in the absence of a spouse or lineal heirs of the decedent. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.23(4)
(1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-15(3) (Repl. vol. 1966). The decedent was nineteen years old
and unmarried.
"1456 F.2d at 67.
"TU.S. CONST. art. VI. The portion of article VI, known as the Supremacy Clause,
provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
"8See text accompanying notes 75-80 infra.
"See Seymour v. Johnson, 235 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1956); Ockerman v. Wise, 202 F.2d
144 (6th Cir. 1953). In both Seymour and Ockerman, the Sixth Circuit felt compelled to
deny diversity jurisdiction in a wrongful death suit where the appointment of a resident
ancillary administrator was required by Kentucky law. The Kentucky legislature has since
changed its qualifications for administrators, allowing personal representatives of intestates
to be non-residents in certain cases. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 395.005 (1972).
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dent."0 Alternatively, the court could have affirmed the district court by
following existing case law as exemplified by Mecom v. Fitzsimmons
Drilling Co.2 1 In Mecom, the Supreme Court decided that in cases involv-
ing executors and administrators, the citizenship of such representatives
controls for diversity purposes when they have the power to bring suits
or be sued.2 2 To have chosen this second alternative would not have
resulted in any conflict with other circuits and would have followed pre-
cedent2 which developed after Mecom.
However, neither alternative was apparently palatable to the Miller
court; it was unwilling to deal with the constitutional issue, yet it was
desirous of reaching an equitable result based on the congressional pur-
pose underlying diversity jurisdiction.2 1 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit
decided to allow jurisdiction, distinguishing substantial precedent by ob-
scure reasoning.2
The Miller court initiated its analysis by acknowledging that there
was a potential constitutional question involved.26 The Supreme Court
has held state statutes unconstitutional which explicitly limited the availa-
bility of wrongful death actions to their own courtszr as violative of the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.2 However, the Fourth Circuit
contended that the North Carolina statute presented no such problem, in
spite of the Supreme Court's Mecom holding.29 The court reasoned that
unless Mecom's rule was "constitutionally required," and an "inflexible,
essential ingredient,""0 there would be no need to label the North Caro-
lina statute unconstitutional, and it could be given "full force and recogni-
tion. . . without attribution. . . of impermissible dominion and control
2E.g., Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. See note I supra.
21284 U.S. 183 (1931).
2id. at 186-87.
2See Hot Oil Service, Inc. v. Hall, 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966); Seymour v. Johnson,
235 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1956); Ockerman v. Wise, 202 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1953). See also
Grady v. Irvine, 254 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 819 (1958).
24456 F.2d at 67. The Fourth Circuit stated: "Diversity jurisdiction exists for the
protection of the noncitizen who is obliged to sue or to be sued in the state of his adversary."
That this was the purpose of the drafters of the Constitution in establishing diversity
jurisdiction was first asserted by Chief Justice Marshall in Bank of the United States v.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809). Not all scholars accept this as the underlying
purpose of diversity. See Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV.
L. REV. 483 (1928).
2456 F.2d at 68.
2 Id. at 64.
2See Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 286 (1871); cf. First
Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
2Note 17 supra.
21456 F.2d at 65.
301d.
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over federal jurisdiction."'" With this declaration of intent, the court
proceeded to its decision by limiting the Mecom rule, using as its source
the Supreme Court's decision in Kramer v. Carribean Mills, Inc.3"
The court was quick to point out that it considered Mecom to be a
case of an "extraordinary" 33 nature; certainly the facts of the case were
complex. An Oklahoma widow was the administratrix of her husband's
estate. She commenced a wrongful death action against the defendant, a
Louisiana corporation, in an Oklahoma state court. The defendant then
removed to federal court, whereupon the plaintiff secured a voluntary
dismissal. These same events occurred twice more, each subsequent ac-
tion being cut short by a voluntary dismissal. Finally, the plaintiff admin-
istratrix resigned and upon her request the Oklahoma probate court ap-
pointed Mecom, a Louisiana attorney, in her place. He then filed another
wrongful death action in the Oklahoma court, and again the defendant
removed to federal court; a motion to remand to the state court was
denied and a trial on the merits followed. On appeal, the district court's
retention of jurisdiction was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit, 3 because the
former administratrix was held to be the "real party in interest" and the
Louisiana attorney but a "nominal" party.
3 5
The Supreme Court came to the opposite result, finding a relationship
of trust on the part of the administrator: "The applicable statutes make
the administrator the trustee of an express trust and require the suit to
be brought and controlled by him."3 Since the administrator had such
responsibilities, his citizenship was determinative for jurisdictional pur-
poses. Even though he did not sign his own bond, did not go to Oklahoma
to be appointed, and upon appointment named the former administratrix
his Oklahoma agent, he was not the nominal party the Tenth Circuit
thought him to be.37 Since his citizenship was the same as that of the
defendant corporation, there was no right to removal, regardless of the
motive behind his appointment. 8
3 1
d.
32394 U.S. 823 (1969).
3456 F.2d at 65.
I'Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 47 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1931).
lId. at 30. Since this decision was prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the notion of real party in interest was not as clearly defined as it is today under
Rule 17(a). The Tenth Circuit based its holding on the cestui que use concept of parties,
and consequently looked to the widow-beneficiary as the cestui que use. The Fourth Circuit
in Miller did much the same without the use of the common law language. For a further
discussion of nominal parties generally and in the Miller context, see note 66 and text
accompanying notes 66-71 infra.




This factual configuration hardly made Mecom an exceptional case;
rather Mecom represented a continuance of earlier Supreme Court deci-
sions. 9 Yet the Miller court felt that citizenship of the representative was
not "constitutionally or inflexibly the criterion for ultimate determination
of diversity,"'" as Mecom has been previously read.4 This would seem to
be a correct evaluation of Mecom; what made the citizenship of the
Louisiana administrator important in that case was his power to bring
suit and responsibility to the beneficiaries. In such a trustee capacity, he
was deemed the real party in interest under federal standards. 2
However, the Miller court's use of Kramer to give flexibility to
Mecom was not appropriate; Kramer did not go to the same issues as
did Mecom. Kramer concerned a Panamanian corporation's assignment
to a Texas attorney of its rights under a contract made with respondent
Carribean Mills, a Haitian corporation." Carribean Mills breached the
contract, at which point the Panamanian corporation then assigned its
interest in the contract to Kramer for the stated consideration of one
dollar. Thereafter, Kramer, by separate agreement of the same day,
agreed to give to the Panamanian corporation ninety-five percent of any
amount recovered by an action on the contract. The Supreme Court saw
Kramer as concerned with one issue: "whether Kramer was 'improperly
or collusively made' a party 'to invoke the jurisdiction' of the District
Court, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1359."" The Court found it
"9See Rice v. Houston, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 66 (1871); Childress v. Emory, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 642 (1823); Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 306 (1808). In
Childress and Chappedelaine, the Supreme Court asserted that the citizenship of the person
having the legal right to sue and to represent those having a beneficial interest in recovery,
rather than the citizenship of those whom he represents, is controlling for diversity purposes,
provided that the representative has actual power to control the suit. Chief Justice Marshall
felt the rule of Childress and Chappadelaine to be "the universally received construction"
that "jurisdiction is neither given nor ousted by the relative situation of the parties con-
cerned in interest, but by the relative situation of the parties named on the record." Osborn
v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 856 (1824).
4456 F.2d at 65.
"1Bush v. Carpenter Brothers, Inc., 447 F.2d 707,711 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Missouri
v. Homesteader Life Ass'n, 90 F.2d 543, 549 (8th Cir. 1937); Worcester County Trust v.
Long, 14 F. Supp. 754, 757 (D. Mass. 1936).
4284 U.S. at 186-87.
43394 U.S. 823 (1969).
"lid. at 825. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1970) provides:
A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which
any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively
made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.
This section has created, in effect, an exception to the principle that the citizenship of the
real party in interest is controlling in diversity determinations. See 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 17.06[2], at 206-07 (2d ed. 1970).
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unnecessary to consider whether motive in the creation of diversity in
cases required to be brought by an administrator was improper or collu-
sive under § 1359."5 The Court also distinguished the positions of admin-
istrators from assignees to buttress its unwillingness to consider adminis-
trators and other personal representatives. 6
The Fourth Circuit, however, found that
[a]t the very least, Kramer authorizes attention to the substantive
relation of the administrator, the beneficiaries and others to the
controversy before an undiscriminating decision that the citizen-
ship of a representative controls the determination of diversity
jurisdiction. 7
Such a construction of Kramer seems at best questionable. The Kramer
decision might indeed have been relevant if there was any inference of
collusion to create diversity in Miller, but such was clearly not the case.
Miller's ancillary administrator was appointed pursuant to statute, not
to obtain federal jurisdiction, but in order that the action could be
brought. Additionally, the statutorily required appointment of the ancil-
lary administrator in Miller had the effect of destroying diversity rather
than creating it. The Fourth Circuit treated the distinction between crea-
tion and destruction as "insignificant." 4 However, an examination of
situations involving § 1359 reveal that such distinction may indeed be
significant. 0
Section 1359 is not applicable to situations involving the destruction
of diversity, whether collusive or not;5 rather it controls only as to the
4394 U.S. at 828 n.9.
461d.
11456 F.2d at 66.
4 The first dismissal was sua sponte by Judge Larkins because the Florida administrator
was unable to bring a wrongful death action. Motive was not at issue; while motive is
important in § 1359 cases, it was not in Miller, since without the appointment of an
ancillary administrator, no action was possible. It can be reasonably inferred that the
"motive" behind the ancillary administrator's appointment was to allow suit to be brought.
1 456 F.2d at 66. But see Lester v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d 1101, 1104 (4th Cir. 1969), in
which the Fourth Circuit gave greater significance to the dinstinction between the creation
and the destruction of diversity. See also McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 875 (3d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
"'See Bass v. Texas Power & Light Co., 432 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 975 (1971); O'Brien v. Avco Corp., 425 F.2d 1030 (2d Cir. 1969); Lester v.
McFaddon, 415 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1969); McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
"See Oakley v. Goodnow, 118 U.S. 43 (1886). Oakley involved Ch. 137, § 5 of the
Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470, the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 1359. The Supreme
Court stated:
While, therefore, the courts of the United States have under the act of
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creation of diversity. Therefore Kramer, which involved the collusive
creation of diversity and turned on an examination of the meaning
of § 1359, could have little to do with Mecom, a case involving the
destruction of diversity, with which § 1359 does not deal at all. Rather
than view Kramer in this light however, the Miller court attributed to it
substantially more import than an analysis of the application of § 1359.
To the Fourth Circuit, the significance of Kramer lay in a grant of
authority to examine duties and responsibilities of a representative before
determining the existence of diversity jurisdiction. To be sure such an
examination was necessary in Kramer because of the mandate of the
statute,52 but § 1359 does not require any such determination when diver-
sity destruction is involved. It is therefore difficult to imagine how
Kramer, dealing as it did with § 1359, can be construed to give any sort
of blanket authority to consider representative duties and responsibilities
when the actions proscribed by § 1359 are not at all involved.
The Fourth Circuit subsequently supported its contention that
Kramer modified Mecom by pointing to prior circuit court decisions."
Consequently, the court felt justified in examining the parties named on
the record before it. It occurred to the court that this was really a case
where federal diversity jurisdiction was present:
In every real sense, this is a diversity case. Had the young
Floridian survived, he clearly could have held the North Carolina
defendants accountable in a federal court. Since his benefici-
aries are Floridians, the controversy is no less interstate after
his death than before.
54
As a result, the Miller court felt that looking to the beneficiaries was
justifiable where a resident ancillary administrator was required to repre-
1875 the power to dismiss or remand a case, if it appears that a colorable
assignment has been made for the purpose of imposing on their jurisdic-
tion, no authority has as yet been given them to take jurisdiction of a case
by removal from a State court when a colorable assignment has been made
to prevent such a removal.
Id. at 45. There is no statute similar to § 1359 requiring that diversity jurisdiction, which
has been artificially defeated, be sustained, 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 17.0512],
at 152 (2d ed. 1970).
52See text of 28 U.S.C. § 1359 at note 44 supra.
1456 F.2d at 66. The Fourth Circuit drew support from Green v. Hale, 433 F.2d 324
(5th Cir. 1970); Bass v. Texas Power & Light Co., 432 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 975 (1971); O'Brien v. Avco Corp., 425 F.2d 1030 (2d Cir. 1969); and McSparran
v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969). Because all these
cases dealt with § 1359 and the collusive creation of diversity, it is difficult to see how they
can be used to support the proposition that Kramer, a § 1359 case, expanded the analysis
required by Mecom, a destruction of diversity case.
11456 F.2d at 67.
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sent the interests of noncitizen beneficiaries as a consequence of the laws
of the state in which the claim arose. 5 To do so, the court contended,
would be in fact what the Supreme Court of North Carolina had done.
To support its decision, the court looked to North Carolina decisions
defining real party in interest." Yet the notion of real party in interest is
far from concrete in North Carolina, and it is questionable to what extent
North Carolina's concept of the term has any relationship to that implicit
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.57
Real party in interest is a procedural matter,58 and therefore federal
law controls, even in diversity cases.59 If the Fourth Circuit was going to
make a true real party in interest analysis, it should have looked first to
federal law for the definition of the term,"0 because most authorities agree
that the real party in interest under federal law is "the party who, by
substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced, and not neces-
sarily the person who might finally benefit from any action.""1 Then the
55 d.
561d.
7FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) provides:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an ex-
press trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made
for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in his
own name without joining with him the party for whose benefit the action
is brought; and when a statute of the United States so provides, an action
for the use or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the United
States. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been
allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by,
or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratifica-
tion, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had
been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
For an excellent explanation of real party in interest in federal courts, see Allen v.
Baker, 327 F. Supp. 706, 710 (N.D. Miss. 1968).
58Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Callahan, 127 F.2d 32, 36 (10th Cir. 1942); Hughey v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 32 F.R.D. 340, 341 (D. Del. 1963); DuVaul v. Miller, 13 F.R.D.
197, 198 (W.D. Mo. 1952).
"'Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-70 (1965); see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78, 92 (1938). As Professor Wright observes, ". . . there is no longer an Erie problem
on matters covered by the Civil Rules. If the rule is valid, and if it applies to the case it is
controlling, and no regard need be paid to contrary state provisions." C. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 59, at 245 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
6 American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. All American Bus Lines, 179 F.2d 7, 10 (10th Cir.
1949); Silvious v. Helmick, 291 F. Supp. 716, 717 (N.D. W. Va. 1968); McNeil Constr.
Co. v. Livingston State Bank, 185 F. Supp. 197, 200-01 (D. Mont. 1960), affd, 330 F.2d
88 (9th Cir. 1962); cf. Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 352-53 (1961).
"WRIGHT § 70, at 293. See Gagliano ex rel. Gagliano v. Bernsen, 243 F.2d 880 (5th
Cir. 1957); Dixey v. Federal Compress & Warehouse Co., 132 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1942);
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court should have looked to state law to determine the party who has such
a right, which would have led in turn to the North Carolina wrongful
death statute.12 As Professor Wright points out, the definition of real
party in interest of the forum state is not applicable because it governs
only a party's right to sue in state courts.13 Since the federal courts,
under Rule 17(a),64 look only to that part of state law which grants the
right to sue, the Fourth Circuit's consideration of North Carolina defini-
tions of the real party in interest and illustrative cases such as Broadfoot
v. Everett 5 for support of its position is an exercise in futility; it makes
no difference whom North Carolina law defines as the real party in
interest.
Likewise, it is difficult to see the ancillary administrator, required by
the North Carolina statute, as a nominal party under the Federal Rules
as the Fourth Circuit seems to have done.6 The properly appointed ad-
ministrator must exist for any action to be prosecuted. He is the proper
party plaintiff in a wrongful death action 6 and has authority and respon-
sibility; he is not a mere figurehead. 9 Such an administrator must exist;
Clark & Moore A New Federal Civil Procedure II. Pleadings and Parties, 44 YALE L.J.
1291 (1935); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 9.2 (1965).
2Cases cited at note 60 supra.
06 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1544 at
647-48 (1971).
"Text of Rule 17(a) appears at note 57 supra.
-270 N.C. 429, 154 S.E.2d 522 (1967). The language in Broadfoot which the Fourth
Circuit found "illustrative" was apparently: "His intestate's widow and two surviving chil-
dren, not he [the administrator], are the real parties in interest." 154 S.E.2d at 525.
11456 F.2d at 67. Since the Miller court did not consider the ancillary administrator
the real party in interest, it could only have meant "nominal" party, since only nominal
parties may be disregarded in the determination of diversity jurisdiction. Salem Trust Co.
v. Manufacturers' Fin. Co., 264 U.S. 182 (1924). In order to be disregarded as a nominal
party, however, the party cannot possess actual powers with regard to the litigation. Only
"[w]here the representative cannot prevent the institution or prosecution of actions, or
exercise any control over them .... may he be treated as a nominal party. WRIGHT § 29,
at 94. See Susquehanna & Wyo. Valley Ry. & Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
172, 177 (1970). See also Howard v. United States, 184 U.S. 676 (1902) (formal obligee of
a bond as a nominal party); Boon's Heirs v. Chiles, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 532 (1834) (dry passive
trustee as nominal party).
"t Young v. Marshburn, 10 N.C. App. 729, 180 S.E.2d 43, 45 (1971).
"Brendle v. Gen. Tire and Rubber Co., 408 F.2d 116, 118 (4th Cir. 1969) (applying
North Carolina law).
"First Union Nat'l Bank v. Hackney, 266 N.C. 17, 145 S.E.2d 352 (1965). The Miller
court distinguished the result of this case, saying that for the North Carolina Supreme
Court to have done otherwise would have been irrational, and indicated that Hackney posed
no problem to Broadfoot, 456 F.2d at 67. Broadfoot, however, was concerned with a
conflicts problem, and the ancillary administrator in question was a Pennsylvania citizen.
154 S.E.2d at 523.
North Carolina cases vacillate considerably, holding that beneficiaries are the real
parties in interest for purposes of North Carolina law, but the administrators have substan-
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if no one has applied for or been issued letters of administration within
six months, a North Carolina statute provides that a public administrator
shall be issued letters,75 even though only a right of action for wrongful
death may exist.7 Therefore, even if an examination of North Carolina
law was necessary, it would seem that an administrator would have been
appointed whether or not the decedent's father, the Florida administra-
tor, had wanted one appointed. This casts doubt upon any claim of
"nominal" status for the ancillary administrator, regardless of whether
or not he is considered the real party in interest. Describing the ancillary
administrator as a nominal party would be equivalent to discarding the
analysis required by Rule 17(a) in the event of a conflict with the policy
behind diversity.
While the Miller court said that the North Carolina cases it cited were
illustrative," the use of the word "illustrate" is misleading. The court
confirmed its real objective in its closing remarks which made reference
to the American Law Institute's Study of the Division of Jurisdiction
Between State and Federal Courts." The court's language indicates a
desire to follow that proposal and that its Miller holding was the nearest
thing possible, since the proposal is not yet law .
7
The Fourth Circuit had, however, another alternative, 5 striking down
tial powers and responsibilities. See, e.g., In re Ives' Estate, 248 N.C. 176, 102 S.E.2d 807
(1958); McCoy v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 229 N.C. 57, 47 S.E.2d 532 (1948); Davenport
v. Patrick, 227 N.C. 686, 44 S.E.2d 203 (1947).
"0N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-20 (Repl. vol. 1966).
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-2.3 (Repl. vol. 1966). Even though no assets exist within
the state except a right of action for wrongful death, an administrator can be appointed.
The right of action is itself an asset. In re Scarbourough, 261 N.C. 565, 135 S.E.2d 529,
531 (1964).
72456 F.2d at 68.
7
3ALI STUDY OF THE DivisioN OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS § 1301 (1969 Official Draft).
11456 F.2d at 68.
16It might be suggested that the Fourth Circuit could have granted diversity jurisdic-
tion without finding the North Carolina statute unconstitutional or torturing Kramer. If
the first dismissal could be viewed as a result of a determination that the doctrine of Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), required dismissal because of noncompliance with
section 28-8(2), the Fourth Circuit might have analyzed Miller on the basis of Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). In Byrd the Supreme Court
directed that federal policy as to how federal courts should be run be added as an affirmative
countervailing consideration to the balance when testing the control of state law. Using the
Byrd analysis, the Fourth Circuit might have viewed the policy underlying diversity as an
affirmative countervailing consideration outweighing North Carolina's interest in statu-
torily requiring resident administrators when the statute works to destroy diversity. Such a
result was approached in Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965), in
which the Fourth Circuit held that the federal policy behind diversity, among other federal
policy considerations, overrode a South Carolina door-closing statute.
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the North Carolina statute requiring a resident administrator as unconsti-
tutional. Such a result seems to arise from looking, at least initially, to
Railway Co. v. Whitton's Administrator." There the Supreme Court
held:
Whenever a general rule as to property or personal rights, or
injuries to either, is established by State legislation, its enforce-
ment by a Federal court in a case between proper parties is a
matter of course, and the jurisdiction of the court, in such case, is
not subject to State limitation."
However, an analysis using Whitton may not be completely satisfactory
because it can be distinguished from Miller in that Whitton involved a
statute which explicitly limited a wrongful death action to the state
courts, while the North Carolina statute is but an implicit limitation.
Mexican Central Railway v. Pinkney78 is more on point in a situation
involving an implicit limitation. In Pinkney it was argued that a Texas
statute which provided that jurisdictional immunity would be waived by
a representative appearance was binding on the federal courts. The Su-
preme Court held to the contrary:
[T]he jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States has
been defined and limited by the acts of Congress, and can be
neither restricted nor enlarged by the statutes of a State.79
Seemingly then, a permutation of federal jurisdiction by states, be it
direct or indirect, has been rejected by the Supreme Court. Unless a state
closes its judicial doors to a particular class of persons in other than a
purely procedural matter, states cannot limit indirectly federal jurisdic-
tion."0
To have found the statute unconstitutional would have allowed the
Millers a federal forum without complicating diversity determination
Such an analysis, however, is suspect because the first determination by the district
court may be viewed not as an Erie decision, but as one arising from the command of Rule
17(a). Rule 17(a) required the district court to apply the federal real party in interest
standard when determining whether the proper parties were before the court. Thus, the
Fourth Circuit was entrapped by a conflict between the policy underlying diversity and a
Federal Rule rather than by a state law-federal policy conflict.
780 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1871).
71d. at 286.
78149 U.S. 194 (1893).
11!d. at 206.
'1rhe North Carolina statute does not "close the doors" of state courts to claims of
nonresident administrators, since the claims can be prosecuted using the ancillary adminis-
trator device. See generally WRIGHT § 46, at 174-77. See also Stewart, The Federal "Door
Closing" Doctrine, II WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 154 (1954).
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procedure. To have done so would also have eliminated potential equal
protection objections to the North Carolina statute. While § 28-8(2) dis-
qualifies anyone who is not a North Carolina resident from being an
administrator of an intestate's estate, it does not disqualify a non-resident
executor of a testate's estate,8 albeit the powers and responsibilities of
executors and resident administrators are substantially the same insofar
as powers to institute or defend actions are concerned.8 2 All a non-
resident executor need do is appoint a resident process agent,,3 while an
administrator must himself be a resident of the state.84 This would seem
to be not only an unnecessary complication but also an effective penali-
zing of the heirs of those who die intestate by virtue of allowing more
limited representation than for those who die testate. The striking down
of the North Carolina statute as unconstitutional would have admittedly
put the Fourth Circuit in conflict with the Sixth Circuit. 5 However, to
look to the beneficiaries still puts the Fourth Circuit in conflict with other
circuits, as well as with the Supreme Court and "conventional wisdom."8
Seemingly overlooked by the Miller court is another ramification of
its decision. If followed, it will lead to extensive procedural complica-
tions, substantially delaying trial by necessitating an in depth party exam-
ination. The simplicity of Mecom and earlier holdings87 allows an instant
determination of diversity; only in § 1359 situations does more extensive
examination become necessary, that is, only in cases involving allegedly
collusively created diversity. However, the Miller decision will lead to
mandatory, presumably pretrial, party exploration, perhaps even going
substantially beyond the pleadings. This would be going further than the
requirements of Rule 17(a), which limits its examination to that party
who is entitled, under substantive law, to bring suit.' While this could
perhaps be rectified by an inclusion in the pleadings of a reference to the
existence of a beneficiary/administrator conflict, this too would be going
beyond the Federal Rules which make no provision for such a compli-
cated procedure. If in fact one of the primary purposes of the Federal
Rules is to simplify pleading, 9 any complication going at cross-purposes
to such aim would seem to be hard to justify.
The Fourth Circuit felt that the federal forum should be allowed the
"See note II supra.
1
2N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-8(2), 28-182 (Repl. vol. 1966).
3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-186 (Repl. vol. 1966).
"'See note II supra.
8See note 19 supra.
"WRIGHT § 29 n.19 (Supp. 1972).
"Note 41 supra.
"8See text accompanying note 57 supra.
"Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
